KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
authorMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Wed, 13 Nov 2019 10:05:44 +0000 (21:05 +1100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 29 Nov 2019 09:08:31 +0000 (10:08 +0100)
commit0815f75f90178bc7e1933cf0d0c818b5f3f5a20c
tree8cf58f0749610a1a923535a68eb7db600e0a25db
parentd1aa3c8004692e4059e1faa30e438bec8af9b9c6
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel

commit af2e8c68b9c5403f77096969c516f742f5bb29e0 upstream.

On some systems that are vulnerable to Spectre v2, it is up to
software to flush the link stack (return address stack), in order to
protect against Spectre-RSB.

When exiting from a guest we do some house keeping and then
potentially exit to C code which is several stack frames deep in the
host kernel. We will then execute a series of returns without
preceeding calls, opening up the possiblity that the guest could have
poisoned the link stack, and direct speculative execution of the host
to a gadget of some sort.

To prevent this we add a flush of the link stack on exit from a guest.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/powerpc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S