random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
authorTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Thu, 22 Dec 2011 21:28:01 +0000 (16:28 -0500)
committerWilly Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Sun, 7 Oct 2012 21:41:14 +0000 (23:41 +0200)
commit0ce367938392bcdc37481aa39f0da26b297903b4
treebf67aa801f03b3e374e4b2d4ea63846c7a8b1a02
parentdd102079e9ad33c7f5377a22f6e381e36d566c61
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store

commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream.

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores.  Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
drivers/char/random.c