Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request
authorDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Fri, 24 Jun 2011 12:38:05 +0000 (08:38 -0400)
committerWilly Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Sat, 11 Feb 2012 14:37:50 +0000 (15:37 +0100)
commit2da16873a83ea82ab1068c025a067d6e24bfa3e9
treef64e86f4fc8728d292971209d135bd401b6a7d5d
parent6c5a7be322b548f42a36b7c738cc52205beb42d6
Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request

commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71 upstream.

A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in
the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an
integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request
header.  This results in copying a very large amount of data via
memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap.  Check for underflow.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
net/bluetooth/l2cap.c