exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tue, 12 Nov 2013 23:11:17 +0000 (15:11 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 29 Nov 2013 18:42:17 +0000 (10:42 -0800)
commit4004afd5f51ad0a86be405522b1ecf28ba66f4e5
tree4cb10f0eeb16122cdb0b0b658de66aacab4d3d12
parent4d290883942593c37e79f66d7ba69f329b0ad9d4
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests

commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream.

The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/ia64/include/asm/processor.h
fs/exec.c
include/linux/binfmts.h
include/linux/sched.h
kernel/ptrace.c