x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:31:49 +0000 (14:31 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 11 Mar 2022 09:03:31 +0000 (10:03 +0100)
commit8edabefdc13294a9b15671937d165b948cf34d69
treecdcd6ebae92a29e9f70a0b218d32a690eaa95242
parent0db1c4307aded2c5e618654f9341a249e0c1051f
x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation

commit eafd987d4a82c7bb5aa12f0e3b4f8f3dea93e678 upstream.

With:

  f8a66d608a3e ("x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd")

it became possible to enable the LFENCE "retpoline" on Intel. However,
Intel doesn't recommend it, as it has some weaknesses compared to
retpoline.

Now AMD doesn't recommend it either.

It can still be left available as a cmdline option. It's faster than
retpoline but is weaker in certain scenarios -- particularly SMT, but
even non-SMT may be vulnerable in some cases.

So just unconditionally warn if the user requests it on the cmdline.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c