rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Wed, 14 Jun 2017 23:12:24 +0000 (00:12 +0100)
committerWilly Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Wed, 1 Nov 2017 21:12:42 +0000 (22:12 +0100)
commit978e42bd2930a79556d539a488372d994206d413
treee0a23113dc36a5d118e60c1bc17efef8e1a16456
parent4f54b2642d4f1f908bf240fe5040925672b51b77
rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode

commit 5f2f97656ada8d811d3c1bef503ced266fcd53a0 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7482.

When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra.  This could
lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
over the end of the buffer.

Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
length.

Reported-by: 石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
net/rxrpc/ar-key.c