ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Mon, 9 Oct 2017 19:51:27 +0000 (12:51 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 27 Oct 2017 08:39:15 +0000 (10:39 +0200)
commite56be12012c28ec61ec5787a232e82be878ed4a9
tree5e7672886495eab966d0819b8997aca6d350a743
parent363ce0b01fe0a0e9e14886e451b077534b7fe7a2
ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload

commit f66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e upstream.

In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are
not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic
because the payload of a revoked key is NULL.  request_key() *does* skip
revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked
before we acquire the key semaphore.

Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return
-EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL.  For completeness we check this
for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys
cannot be revoked currently.

Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to
fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it
seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer.

Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c