btrfs: fix signed overflows in btrfs_sync_file
authorDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Mon, 9 Nov 2015 10:44:45 +0000 (11:44 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 15 Dec 2015 05:41:06 +0000 (21:41 -0800)
commitf0009492b51e67fc498ab6bcc127c9b418806e71
tree05a84a861a6a59fe95faa9dff5841f3efd82fa00
parent82c82fadbd75f62bfb9d83eb3a308b55f4c4507d
btrfs: fix signed overflows in btrfs_sync_file

commit 9dcbeed4d7e11e1dcf5e55475de3754f0855d1c2 upstream.

The calculation of range length in btrfs_sync_file leads to signed
overflow. This was caught by PaX gcc SIZE_OVERFLOW plugin.

https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=4284

The fsync call passes 0 and LLONG_MAX, the range length does not fit to
loff_t and overflows, but the value is converted to u64 so it silently
works as expected.

The minimal fix is a typecast to u64, switching functions to take
(start, end) instead of (start, len) would be more intrusive.

Coccinelle script found that there's one more opencoded calculation of
the length.

<smpl>
@@
loff_t start, end;
@@
* end - start
</smpl>

Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/btrfs/file.c