mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well

commit 7e44a0b597f04e67eee8cdcbe7ee706c6f5de38b upstream.

Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP
should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC
protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway.

However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms
that drivers might implement.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.430e8c202313.Ia37e4e5b6b3eaab1a5ae050e015f6c92859dbe27@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index b1c017faa1ae99c9ba9d6d29d5145360de37ee86..9e0bcffbc3edfd034a7050d74b8d836aa5840cb0 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2023,6 +2023,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
                         * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
                         */
                        entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
+                       entry->is_protected = true;
                        entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
                        memcpy(entry->last_pn,
                               rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
@@ -2035,6 +2036,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
                                     sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
                        BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
                                     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+               } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+                       entry->is_protected = true;
+                       entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
                }
                return RX_QUEUED;
        }
@@ -2076,6 +2080,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
                if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
                        return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
                memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+       } else if (entry->is_protected &&
+                  (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
+                   rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
+               /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
+                * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
+                * lost cause anyway.
+                */
+               return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
        }
 
        skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));

diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
index b8110ac38b30ee7852d79ca4d67817f6b66d1268..fd31c4db1282133c964fcbd002fbb6ca2eaadbf0 100644 (file)
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
@@ -408,7 +408,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
        u16 extra_len;
        u16 last_frag;
        u8 rx_queue;
-       bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+       u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+          is_protected:1;
        u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
        unsigned int key_color;
 };