CMD( MI_LOAD_SCAN_LINES_EXCL, SMI, !F, 0x3F, R ),
};
+/*
+ * For Gen9 we can still rely on the h/w to enforce cmd security, and only
+ * need to re-enforce the register access checks. We therefore only need to
+ * teach the cmdparser how to find the end of each command, and identify
+ * register accesses. The table doesn't need to reject any commands, and so
+ * the only commands listed here are:
+ * 1) Those that touch registers
+ * 2) Those that do not have the default 8-bit length
+ *
+ * Note that the default MI length mask chosen for this table is 0xFF, not
+ * the 0x3F used on older devices. This is because the vast majority of MI
+ * cmds on Gen9 use a standard 8-bit Length field.
+ * All the Gen9 blitter instructions are standard 0xFF length mask, and
+ * none allow access to non-general registers, so in fact no BLT cmds are
+ * included in the table at all.
+ *
+ */
+static const struct drm_i915_cmd_descriptor gen9_blt_cmds[] = {
+ CMD( MI_NOOP, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_USER_INTERRUPT, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_WAIT_FOR_EVENT, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_FLUSH, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_ARB_CHECK, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_REPORT_HEAD, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_ARB_ON_OFF, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_SUSPEND_FLUSH, SMI, F, 1, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_SCAN_LINES_INCL, SMI, !F, 0x3F, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_SCAN_LINES_EXCL, SMI, !F, 0x3F, S ),
+ CMD( MI_STORE_DWORD_IMM, SMI, !F, 0x3FF, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_REGISTER_IMM(1), SMI, !F, 0xFF, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC, .step = 2 } ),
+ CMD( MI_UPDATE_GTT, SMI, !F, 0x3FF, S ),
+ CMD( MI_STORE_REGISTER_MEM_GEN8, SMI, F, 4, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC } ),
+ CMD( MI_FLUSH_DW, SMI, !F, 0x3F, S ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_REGISTER_MEM_GEN8, SMI, F, 4, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC } ),
+ CMD( MI_LOAD_REGISTER_REG, SMI, !F, 0xFF, W,
+ .reg = { .offset = 1, .mask = 0x007FFFFC, .step = 1 } ),
+};
+
#undef CMD
#undef SMI
#undef S3D
{ hsw_blt_cmds, ARRAY_SIZE(hsw_blt_cmds) },
};
+static const struct drm_i915_cmd_table gen9_blt_cmd_table[] = {
+ { gen9_blt_cmds, ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_cmds) },
+};
+
+
/*
* Register whitelists, sorted by increasing register offset.
*/
#define REG64(addr) \
REG32(addr), REG32(addr + sizeof(u32))
+#define REG64_IDX(_reg, idx) \
+ { .addr = _reg(idx) }, \
+ { .addr = _reg ## _UDW(idx) }
+
static const struct drm_i915_reg_descriptor gen7_render_regs[] = {
REG64(GPGPU_THREADS_DISPATCHED),
REG64(HS_INVOCATION_COUNT),
REG32(BCS_SWCTRL),
};
+static const struct drm_i915_reg_descriptor gen9_blt_regs[] = {
+ REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, RENDER_RING_BASE),
+ REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, BSD_RING_BASE),
+ REG32(BCS_SWCTRL),
+ REG64_IDX(RING_TIMESTAMP, BLT_RING_BASE),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 0),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 1),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 2),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 3),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 4),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 5),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 6),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 7),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 8),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 9),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 10),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 11),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 12),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 13),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 14),
+ REG64_IDX(BCS_GPR, 15),
+};
+
#undef REG64
#undef REG32
return 0;
}
+static u32 gen9_blt_get_cmd_length_mask(u32 cmd_header)
+{
+ u32 client = (cmd_header & INSTR_CLIENT_MASK) >> INSTR_CLIENT_SHIFT;
+
+ if (client == INSTR_MI_CLIENT || client == INSTR_BC_CLIENT)
+ return 0xFF;
+
+ DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("CMD: Abnormal blt cmd length! 0x%08X\n", cmd_header);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool validate_cmds_sorted(struct intel_engine_cs *ring,
const struct drm_i915_cmd_table *cmd_tables,
int cmd_table_count)
int cmd_table_count;
int ret;
- if (!IS_GEN7(ring->dev))
+ if (!IS_GEN7(ring->dev) && !(IS_GEN9(ring->dev) && ring->id == BCS))
return 0;
switch (ring->id) {
ring->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_bsd_get_cmd_length_mask;
break;
case BCS:
- if (IS_HASWELL(ring->dev)) {
+ ring->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_blt_get_cmd_length_mask;
+ if (IS_GEN9(ring->dev)) {
+ cmd_tables = gen9_blt_cmd_table;
+ cmd_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_cmd_table);
+ ring->get_cmd_length_mask =
+ gen9_blt_get_cmd_length_mask;
+
+ /* BCS Engine unsafe without parser */
+ ring->requires_cmd_parser = 1;
+ }
+ else if (IS_HASWELL(ring->dev)) {
cmd_tables = hsw_blt_ring_cmd_table;
cmd_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(hsw_blt_ring_cmd_table);
} else {
cmd_table_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen7_blt_cmd_table);
}
- ring->reg_table = gen7_blt_regs;
- ring->reg_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen7_blt_regs);
+ if (IS_GEN9(ring->dev)) {
+ ring->reg_table = gen9_blt_regs;
+ ring->reg_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen9_blt_regs);
+ } else {
+ ring->reg_table = gen7_blt_regs;
+ ring->reg_count = ARRAY_SIZE(gen7_blt_regs);
+ }
- ring->get_cmd_length_mask = gen7_blt_get_cmd_length_mask;
break;
case VECS:
cmd_tables = hsw_vebox_cmd_table;
}
/*
- * If the batch buffer contains a chained batch, return an
- * error that tells the caller to abort and dispatch the
- * workload as a non-secure batch.
+ * We don't try to handle BATCH_BUFFER_START because it adds
+ * non-trivial complexity. Instead we abort the scan and return
+ * and error to indicate that the batch is unsafe.
*/
if (desc->cmd.value == MI_BATCH_BUFFER_START) {
ret = -EACCES;
}
if (!check_cmd(ring, desc, cmd, length, &oacontrol_set)) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
+ ret = CMDPARSER_USES_GGTT(ring->dev) ? -EINVAL : -EACCES;
break;
}
*
* Return: the current version number of the cmd parser
*/
-int i915_cmd_parser_get_version(void)
+int i915_cmd_parser_get_version(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv)
{
/*
* Command parser version history
* 3. Allow access to the GPGPU_THREADS_DISPATCHED register.
* 4. L3 atomic chicken bits of HSW_SCRATCH1 and HSW_ROW_CHICKEN3.
* 5. GPGPU dispatch compute indirect registers.
+ * 10. Gen9 only - Supports the new ppgtt based BLIT parser
*/
- return 5;
+ return CMDPARSER_USES_GGTT(dev_priv) ? 5 : 10;
}
projects / wrapfs-3.2.y.git / commitdiff