keys: Handle there being no fallback destination keyring for request_key()

commit 34574dd10b6d0697b86703388d6d6af9cbf4bb48 upstream.

When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process
keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an
oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on
dest_keyring's semaphore.

Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called
from request_key_and_link().

This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within
the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so
PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act
as the fallback.

To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is
no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 0e04f72ef2d4339c8ac50691d0171e138dc11df2..ab70cabafa18b64d4182baf4fefdc329b577dd93 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 
        set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
 
-       down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+       if (dest_keyring)
+               down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
 
        /* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
         * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
@@ -322,10 +323,12 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
        if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
                goto key_already_present;
 
-       __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+       if (dest_keyring)
+               __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
 
        mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
-       up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+       if (dest_keyring)
+               up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
        mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
        *_key = key;
        kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));