[PATCH] aacraid: fix security hole

On the SCSI layer ioctl path there is no implicit permissions check for
ioctls (and indeed other drivers implement unprivileged ioctls). aacraid
however allows all sorts of very admin only things to be done so should
check.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Salyzyn <mark_salyzyn@adaptec.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
index d2cf875af59b6139fa99f63257b1e189fc22551a..3d5cff718567fafd8364395d38b62b185c247730 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
@@ -539,6 +539,8 @@ static int aac_cfg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static int aac_cfg_ioctl(struct inode *inode,  struct file *file,
                unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
        return aac_do_ioctl(file->private_data, cmd, (void __user *)arg);
 }
 
@@ -592,6 +594,8 @@ static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg)
 
 static long aac_compat_cfg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
        return aac_compat_do_ioctl((struct aac_dev *)file->private_data, cmd, arg);
 }
 #endif