David S. Miller [Tue, 30 Jul 2013 07:16:21 +0000 (00:16 -0700)]
net_sched: Fix stack info leak in cbq_dump_wrr().
[ Upstream commit
a0db856a95a29efb1c23db55c02d9f0ff4f0db48 ]
Make sure the reserved fields, and padding (if any), are
fully initialized.
Based upon a patch by Dan Carpenter and feedback from
Joe Perches.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Neil Horman [Wed, 12 Jun 2013 18:26:44 +0000 (14:26 -0400)]
sctp: fully initialize sctp_outq in sctp_outq_init
[ Upstream commit
c5c7774d7eb4397891edca9ebdf750ba90977a69 ]
In commit
2f94aabd9f6c925d77aecb3ff020f1cc12ed8f86
(refactor sctp_outq_teardown to insure proper re-initalization)
we modified sctp_outq_teardown to use sctp_outq_init to fully re-initalize the
outq structure. Steve West recently asked me why I removed the q->error = 0
initalization from sctp_outq_teardown. I did so because I was operating under
the impression that sctp_outq_init would properly initalize that value for us,
but it doesn't. sctp_outq_init operates under the assumption that the outq
struct is all 0's (as it is when called from sctp_association_init), but using
it in __sctp_outq_teardown violates that assumption. We should do a memset in
sctp_outq_init to ensure that the entire structure is in a known state there
instead.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: "West, Steve (NSN - US/Fort Worth)" <steve.west@nsn.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
CC: davem@davemloft.net
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Michal Tesar [Fri, 19 Jul 2013 12:09:01 +0000 (14:09 +0200)]
sysctl net: Keep tcp_syn_retries inside the boundary
[ Upstream commit
651e92716aaae60fc41b9652f54cb6803896e0da ]
Limit the min/max value passed to the
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syn_retries.
Signed-off-by: Michal Tesar <mtesar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Dan Carpenter [Fri, 19 Jul 2013 05:48:05 +0000 (08:48 +0300)]
arcnet: cleanup sizeof parameter
[ Upstream commit
087d273caf4f7d3f2159256f255f1f432bc84a5b ]
This patch doesn't change the compiled code because ARC_HDR_SIZE is 4
and sizeof(int) is 4, but the intent was to use the header size and not
the sizeof the header size.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Thu, 18 Jul 2013 16:35:10 +0000 (09:35 -0700)]
vlan: fix a race in egress prio management
[ Upstream commit
3e3aac497513c669e1c62c71e1d552ea85c1d974 ]
egress_priority_map[] hash table updates are protected by rtnl,
and we never remove elements until device is dismantled.
We have to make sure that before inserting an new element in hash table,
all its fields are committed to memory or else another cpu could
find corrupt values and crash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
dingtianhong [Thu, 11 Jul 2013 11:04:06 +0000 (19:04 +0800)]
ifb: fix oops when loading the ifb failed
[ Upstream commit
f2966cd5691058b8674a20766525bedeaea9cbcf ]
If __rtnl_link_register() return faild when loading the ifb, it will
take the wrong path and get oops, so fix it just like dummy.
Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
dingtianhong [Thu, 11 Jul 2013 11:04:02 +0000 (19:04 +0800)]
dummy: fix oops when loading the dummy failed
[ Upstream commit
2c8a01894a12665d8059fad8f0a293c98a264121 ]
We rename the dummy in modprobe.conf like this:
install dummy0 /sbin/modprobe -o dummy0 --ignore-install dummy
install dummy1 /sbin/modprobe -o dummy1 --ignore-install dummy
We got oops when we run the command:
modprobe dummy0
modprobe dummy1
------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 3302.187584] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000008
[ 3302.195411] IP: [<
ffffffff813fe62a>] __rtnl_link_unregister+0x9a/0xd0
[ 3302.201844] PGD
85c94a067 PUD
8517bd067 PMD 0
[ 3302.206305] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 3302.299737] task:
ffff88105ccea300 ti:
ffff880eba4a0000 task.ti:
ffff880eba4a0000
[ 3302.307186] RIP: 0010:[<
ffffffff813fe62a>] [<
ffffffff813fe62a>] __rtnl_link_unregister+0x9a/0xd0
[ 3302.316044] RSP: 0018:
ffff880eba4a1dd8 EFLAGS:
00010246
[ 3302.321332] RAX:
0000000000000000 RBX:
ffffffff81a9d738 RCX:
0000000000000002
[ 3302.328436] RDX:
0000000000000000 RSI:
ffffffffa04d602c RDI:
ffff880eba4a1dd8
[ 3302.335541] RBP:
ffff880eba4a1e18 R08:
dead000000200200 R09:
dead000000100100
[ 3302.342644] R10:
0000000000000080 R11:
0000000000000003 R12:
ffffffff81a9d788
[ 3302.349748] R13:
ffffffffa04d7020 R14:
ffffffff81a9d670 R15:
ffff880eba4a1dd8
[ 3302.364910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
0000000080050033
[ 3302.370630] CR2:
0000000000000008 CR3:
000000085e15e000 CR4:
00000000000427e0
[ 3302.377734] DR0:
0000000000000003 DR1:
00000000000000b0 DR2:
0000000000000001
[ 3302.384838] DR3:
0000000000000000 DR6:
00000000ffff0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[ 3302.391940] Stack:
[ 3302.393944]
ffff880eba4a1dd8 ffff880eba4a1dd8 ffff880eba4a1e18 ffffffffa04d70c0
[ 3302.401350]
00000000ffffffef ffffffffa01a8000 0000000000000000 ffffffff816111c8
[ 3302.408758]
ffff880eba4a1e48 ffffffffa01a80be ffff880eba4a1e48 ffffffffa04d70c0
[ 3302.416164] Call Trace:
[ 3302.418605] [<
ffffffffa01a8000>] ? 0xffffffffa01a7fff
[ 3302.423727] [<
ffffffffa01a80be>] dummy_init_module+0xbe/0x1000 [dummy0]
[ 3302.430405] [<
ffffffffa01a8000>] ? 0xffffffffa01a7fff
[ 3302.435535] [<
ffffffff81000322>] do_one_initcall+0x152/0x1b0
[ 3302.441263] [<
ffffffff810ab24b>] do_init_module+0x7b/0x200
[ 3302.446824] [<
ffffffff810ad3d2>] load_module+0x4e2/0x530
[ 3302.452215] [<
ffffffff8127ae40>] ? ddebug_dyndbg_boot_param_cb+0x60/0x60
[ 3302.458979] [<
ffffffff810ad5f1>] SyS_init_module+0xd1/0x130
[ 3302.464627] [<
ffffffff814b9652>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 3302.490090] RIP [<
ffffffff813fe62a>] __rtnl_link_unregister+0x9a/0xd0
[ 3302.496607] RSP <
ffff880eba4a1dd8>
[ 3302.500084] CR2:
0000000000000008
[ 3302.503466] ---[ end trace
8342d49cd49f78ed ]---
The reason is that when loading dummy, if __rtnl_link_register() return failed,
the init_module should return and avoid take the wrong path.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
dingtianhong [Wed, 10 Jul 2013 04:04:02 +0000 (12:04 +0800)]
ifb: fix rcu_sched self-detected stalls
[ Upstream commit
440d57bc5ff55ec1efb3efc9cbe9420b4bbdfefa ]
According to the commit
16b0dc29c1af9df341428f4c49ada4f626258082
(dummy: fix rcu_sched self-detected stalls)
Eric Dumazet fix the problem in dummy, but the ifb will occur the
same problem like the dummy modules.
Trying to "modprobe ifb numifbs=30000" triggers :
INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
After this splat, RTNL is locked and reboot is needed.
We must call cond_resched() to avoid this, even holding RTNL.
Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[wt: 2.6.32: cond_resched() needs linux/sched.h]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Dave Kleikamp [Mon, 1 Jul 2013 21:49:22 +0000 (16:49 -0500)]
sunvnet: vnet_port_remove must call unregister_netdev
[ Upstream commit
aabb9875d02559ab9b928cd6f259a5cc4c21a589 ]
The missing call to unregister_netdev() leaves the interface active
after the driver is unloaded by rmmod.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Changli Gao [Fri, 28 Jun 2013 16:15:51 +0000 (00:15 +0800)]
net: Swap ver and type in pppoe_hdr
[ Upstream commit
b1a5a34bd0b8767ea689e68f8ea513e9710b671e ]
Ver and type in pppoe_hdr should be swapped as defined by RFC2516
section-4.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Fri, 28 Jun 2013 09:37:42 +0000 (02:37 -0700)]
neighbour: fix a race in neigh_destroy()
[ Upstream commit
c9ab4d85de222f3390c67aedc9c18a50e767531e ]
There is a race in neighbour code, because neigh_destroy() uses
skb_queue_purge(&neigh->arp_queue) without holding neighbour lock,
while other parts of the code assume neighbour rwlock is what
protects arp_queue
Convert all skb_queue_purge() calls to the __skb_queue_purge() variant
Use __skb_queue_head_init() instead of skb_queue_head_init()
to make clear we do not use arp_queue.lock
And hold neigh->lock in neigh_destroy() to close the race.
Reported-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Daniel Borkmann [Wed, 12 Jun 2013 14:02:27 +0000 (16:02 +0200)]
packet: packet_getname_spkt: make sure string is always 0-terminated
[ Upstream commit
2dc85bf323515e59e15dfa858d1472bb25cad0fe ]
uaddr->sa_data is exactly of size 14, which is hard-coded here and
passed as a size argument to strncpy(). A device name can be of size
IFNAMSIZ (== 16), meaning we might leave the destination string
unterminated. Thus, use strlcpy() and also sizeof() while we're
at it. We need to memset the data area beforehand, since strlcpy
does not padd the remaining buffer with zeroes for user space, so
that we do not possibly leak anything.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Daniel Borkmann [Thu, 6 Jun 2013 13:53:47 +0000 (15:53 +0200)]
net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket destruction
[ Upstream commit
1abd165ed757db1afdefaac0a4bc8a70f97d258c ]
While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000020
IP: [<
ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
PGD
7cead067 PUD
7ce76067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...]
CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF 3.10.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011
task:
ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti:
ffff88007b568000 task.ti:
ffff88007b568000
RIP: 0010:[<
ffffffffa0490c4e>] [<
ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
RSP: 0018:
ffff88007b569e08 EFLAGS:
00010292
RAX:
0000000000000000 RBX:
ffff88007db78a00 RCX:
dead000000200200
RDX:
ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI:
ffff8800379baf38 RDI:
0000000000000000
RBP:
ffff88007b569e18 R08:
ffff88007c230da0 R09:
0000000000000001
R10:
0000000000000000 R11:
0000000000000000 R12:
0000000000000000
R13:
ffff880077990d00 R14:
0000000000000084 R15:
ffff88007db78a00
FS:
00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:
ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:
0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
000000008005003b
CR2:
0000000000000020 CR3:
000000007cf9d000 CR4:
00000000000007e0
DR0:
0000000000000000 DR1:
0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
DR3:
0000000000000000 DR6:
00000000ffff0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
Stack:
ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded
ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e
Call Trace:
[<
ffffffffa049fded>] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp]
[<
ffffffff8145b60e>] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0
[<
ffffffff814df36e>] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350
[<
ffffffff81455a6f>] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240
[<
ffffffff81455bf0>] sock_create+0x30/0x40
[<
ffffffff8145696c>] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0
[<
ffffffff815403be>] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10
[<
ffffffff8153cb32>] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30
[<
ffffffff81544e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f
1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 <48>
8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48
RIP [<
ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
RSP <
ffff88007b569e08>
CR2:
0000000000000020
---[ end trace
e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]---
I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a
small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds,
listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills
some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this).
Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes.
This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable''
is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init()
we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate
our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario,
it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from
crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via
sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer
dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during
sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now,
if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just
leave the destruction handler.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Fri, 24 May 2013 05:49:58 +0000 (05:49 +0000)]
ip_tunnel: fix kernel panic with icmp_dest_unreach
[ Upstream commit
a622260254ee481747cceaaa8609985b29a31565 ]
Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call
graph:
Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html
And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP
stack.
We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure()
is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation
layer.
A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in
linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well.
Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing !
Reported-by: Daniel Petre <daniel.petre@rcs-rds.ro>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Fri, 17 May 2013 04:53:13 +0000 (04:53 +0000)]
ipv6: fix possible crashes in ip6_cork_release()
[ Upstream commit
284041ef21fdf2e0d216ab6b787bc9072b4eb58a ]
commit
0178b695fd6b4 ("ipv6: Copy cork options in ip6_append_data")
added some code duplication and bad error recovery, leading to potential
crash in ip6_cork_release() as kfree() could be called with garbage.
use kzalloc() to make sure this wont happen.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Mon, 13 May 2013 21:25:52 +0000 (21:25 +0000)]
tcp: fix tcp_md5_hash_skb_data()
[ Upstream commit
54d27fcb338bd9c42d1dfc5a39e18f6f9d373c2e ]
TCP md5 communications fail [1] for some devices, because sg/crypto code
assume page offsets are below PAGE_SIZE.
This was discovered using mlx4 driver [2], but I suspect loopback
might trigger the same bug now we use order-3 pages in tcp_sendmsg()
[1] Failure is giving following messages.
huh, entered softirq 3 NET_RX
ffffffff806ad230 preempt_count
00000100,
exited with
00000101?
[2] mlx4 driver uses order-2 pages to allocate RX frags
Reported-by: Matt Schnall <mischnal@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Bernhard Beck <bbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Ricardo Ribalda [Tue, 1 Oct 2013 06:17:10 +0000 (08:17 +0200)]
ll_temac: Reset dma descriptors indexes on ndo_open
[ Upstream commit
7167cf0e8cd10287b7912b9ffcccd9616f382922 ]
The dma descriptors indexes are only initialized on the probe function.
If a packet is on the buffer when temac_stop is called, the dma
descriptors indexes can be left on a incorrect state where no other
package can be sent.
So an interface could be left in an usable state after ifdow/ifup.
This patch makes sure that the descriptors indexes are in a proper
status when the device is open.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Neil Horman [Fri, 27 Sep 2013 16:22:15 +0000 (12:22 -0400)]
bonding: Fix broken promiscuity reference counting issue
[ Upstream commit
5a0068deb611109c5ba77358be533f763f395ee4 ]
Recently grabbed this report:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=
1005567
Of an issue in which the bonding driver, with an attached vlan encountered the
following errors when bond0 was taken down and back up:
dummy1: promiscuity touches roof, set promiscuity failed. promiscuity feature of
device might be broken.
The error occurs because, during __bond_release_one, if we release our last
slave, we take on a random mac address and issue a NETDEV_CHANGEADDR
notification. With an attached vlan, the vlan may see that the vlan and bond
mac address were in sync, but no longer are. This triggers a call to dev_uc_add
and dev_set_rx_mode, which enables IFF_PROMISC on the bond device. Then, when
we complete __bond_release_one, we use the current state of the bond flags to
determine if we should decrement the promiscuity of the releasing slave. But
since the bond changed promiscuity state during the release operation, we
incorrectly decrement the slave promisc count when it wasn't in promiscuous mode
to begin with, causing the above error
Fix is pretty simple, just cache the bonding flags at the start of the function
and use those when determining the need to set promiscuity.
This is also needed for the ALLMULTI flag
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Mark Wu <wudxw@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Reported-by: Mark Wu <wudxw@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Peter Korsgaard [Mon, 30 Sep 2013 21:28:20 +0000 (23:28 +0200)]
dm9601: fix IFF_ALLMULTI handling
[ Upstream commit
bf0ea6380724beb64f27a722dfc4b0edabff816e ]
Pass-all-multicast is controlled by bit 3 in RX control, not bit 2
(pass undersized frames).
Reported-by: Joseph Chang <joseph_chang@davicom.com.tw>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Salam Noureddine [Sun, 29 Sep 2013 20:39:42 +0000 (13:39 -0700)]
ipv4 igmp: use in_dev_put in timer handlers instead of __in_dev_put
[ Upstream commit
e2401654dd0f5f3fb7a8d80dad9554d73d7ca394 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ip_mc_down so use in_dev_put instead of __in_dev_put in the handler
function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt reaches 0.
Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the in_device being
destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to the net_device and
see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Salam Noureddine [Sun, 29 Sep 2013 20:41:34 +0000 (13:41 -0700)]
ipv6 mcast: use in6_dev_put in timer handlers instead of __in6_dev_put
[ Upstream commit
9260d3e1013701aa814d10c8fc6a9f92bd17d643 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ipv6_mc_down so use in6_dev_put instead of __in6_dev_put in the
handler function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt
reaches 0. Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the
inet6_dev being destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to
the net_device and see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Chris Healy [Thu, 12 Sep 2013 04:37:47 +0000 (21:37 -0700)]
resubmit bridge: fix message_age_timer calculation
[ Upstream commit
9a0620133ccce9dd35c00a96405c8d80938c2cc0 ]
This changes the message_age_timer calculation to use the BPDU's max age as
opposed to the local bridge's max age. This is in accordance with section
8.6.2.3.2 Step 2 of the 802.1D-1998 sprecification.
With the current implementation, when running with very large bridge
diameters, convergance will not always occur even if a root bridge is
configured to have a longer max age.
Tested successfully on bridge diameters of ~200.
Signed-off-by: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mariusz Ceier [Mon, 21 Oct 2013 17:45:04 +0000 (19:45 +0200)]
davinci_emac.c: Fix IFF_ALLMULTI setup
[ Upstream commit
d69e0f7ea95fef8059251325a79c004bac01f018 ]
When IFF_ALLMULTI flag is set on interface and IFF_PROMISC isn't,
emac_dev_mcast_set should only enable RX of multicasts and reset
MACHASH registers.
It does this, but afterwards it either sets up multicast MACs
filtering or disables RX of multicasts and resets MACHASH registers
again, rendering IFF_ALLMULTI flag useless.
This patch fixes emac_dev_mcast_set, so that multicast MACs filtering and
disabling of RX of multicasts are skipped when IFF_ALLMULTI flag is set.
Tested with kernel 2.6.37.
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Ceier <mceier+kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mugunthan V N <mugunthanvnm@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Salva Peiró [Wed, 16 Oct 2013 10:46:50 +0000 (12:46 +0200)]
wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
[ Upstream commit
2b13d06c9584b4eb773f1e80bbaedab9a1c344e1 ]
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Vlad Yasevich [Wed, 16 Oct 2013 02:01:31 +0000 (22:01 -0400)]
sctp: Perform software checksum if packet has to be fragmented.
[ Upstream commit
d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]
IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Fan Du [Wed, 16 Oct 2013 02:01:30 +0000 (22:01 -0400)]
sctp: Use software crc32 checksum when xfrm transform will happen.
[ Upstream commit
27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]
igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Vlad Yasevich [Wed, 16 Oct 2013 02:01:29 +0000 (22:01 -0400)]
net: dst: provide accessor function to dst->xfrm
[ Upstream commit
e87b3998d795123b4139bc3f25490dd236f68212 ]
dst->xfrm is conditionally defined. Provide accessor funtion that
is always available.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Mon, 30 Sep 2013 20:03:07 +0000 (22:03 +0200)]
connector: use nlmsg_len() to check message length
[ Upstream commit
162b2bedc084d2d908a04c93383ba02348b648b0 ]
The current code tests the length of the whole netlink message to be
at least as long to fit a cn_msg. This is wrong as nlmsg_len includes
the length of the netlink message header. Use nlmsg_len() instead to
fix this "off-by-NLMSG_HDRLEN" size check.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.14+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Salva Peiró [Fri, 11 Oct 2013 09:50:03 +0000 (12:50 +0300)]
farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
[ Upstream commit
96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194 ]
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Marc Kleine-Budde [Mon, 7 Oct 2013 21:19:58 +0000 (23:19 +0200)]
net: vlan: fix nlmsg size calculation in vlan_get_size()
[ Upstream commit
c33a39c575068c2ea9bffb22fd6de2df19c74b89 ]
This patch fixes the calculation of the nlmsg size, by adding the missing
nla_total_size().
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Marc Kleine-Budde [Sat, 5 Oct 2013 19:25:17 +0000 (21:25 +0200)]
can: dev: fix nlmsg size calculation in can_get_size()
[ Upstream commit
fe119a05f8ca481623a8d02efcc984332e612528 ]
This patch fixes the calculation of the nlmsg size, by adding the missing
nla_total_size().
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Mon, 30 Sep 2013 20:03:06 +0000 (22:03 +0200)]
proc connector: fix info leaks
[ Upstream commit
e727ca82e0e9616ab4844301e6bae60ca7327682 ]
Initialize event_data for all possible message types to prevent leaking
kernel stack contents to userland (up to 20 bytes). Also set the flags
member of the connector message to 0 to prevent leaking two more stack
bytes this way.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.15+
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Dan Carpenter [Wed, 2 Oct 2013 21:27:20 +0000 (00:27 +0300)]
net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()
[ Upstream commit
1661bf364ae9c506bc8795fef70d1532931be1e8 ]
We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr(). It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.
The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
move_addr_to_user()
audit_sockaddr()
__audit_sockaddr()
Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <juri.aedla@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[wt: 2.6.32: msg_sys is a struct, not a pointer]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Wed, 2 Oct 2013 04:04:11 +0000 (21:04 -0700)]
net: do not call sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets
[ Upstream commit
80ad1d61e72d626e30ebe8529a0455e660ca4693 ]
commit
3ab5aee7fe84 ("net: Convert TCP & DCCP hash tables to use RCU /
hlist_nulls") incorrectly used sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets.
We should instead use inet_twsk_put()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Tue, 15 Oct 2013 18:54:30 +0000 (11:54 -0700)]
tcp: must unclone packets before mangling them
[ Upstream commit
c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]
TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.
We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.
Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo->gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.
We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.
This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.
Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Wed, 23 Nov 2011 20:49:31 +0000 (15:49 -0500)]
ipv6: tcp: fix panic in SYN processing
commit
72a3effaf633bc ([NET]: Size listen hash tables using backlog
hint) added a bug allowing inet6_synq_hash() to return an out of bound
array index, because of u16 overflow.
Bug can happen if system admins set net.core.somaxconn &
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog sysctls to values greater than 65536
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit
c16a98ed91597b40b22b540c6517103497ef8e74)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Nikola Pajkovsky [Fri, 11 Oct 2013 06:48:34 +0000 (08:48 +0200)]
crypto: api - Fix race condition in larval lookup
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/
1016108
64z is missing rhel6 commit
3af031a395c0 ("[crypto] algboss: Hold ref
count on larval") which is causing cosmetic fuzz, because crypto_alg_get
was move from crypto/api.c to crypto/internal.h.
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[ upstream commit
77dbd7a95e4a4f15264c333a9e9ab97ee27dc2aa ]
crypto_larval_lookup should only return a larval if it created one.
Any larval created by another entity must be processed through
crypto_larval_wait before being returned.
Otherwise this will lead to a larval being killed twice, which
will most likely lead to a crash.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <npajkovs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 11 Sep 2013 19:56:50 +0000 (19:56 +0000)]
HID: provide a helper for validating hid reports
commit
331415ff16a12147d57d5c953f3a961b7ede348b upstream
Many drivers need to validate the characteristics of their HID report
during initialization to avoid misusing the reports. This adds a common
helper to perform validation of the report exisitng, the field existing,
and the expected number of values within the field.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[jmm: backported to 2.6.32]
[wt: dev_err() in 2.6.32 instead of hid_err()]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:32:01 +0000 (20:32 +0000)]
HID: check for NULL field when setting values
commit
be67b68d52fa28b9b721c47bb42068f0c1214855 upstream
Defensively check that the field to be worked on is not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 11 Sep 2013 19:56:54 +0000 (19:56 +0000)]
HID: LG: validate HID output report details
commit
0fb6bd06e06792469acc15bbe427361b56ada528 upstream
A HID device could send a malicious output report that would cause the
lg, lg3, and lg4 HID drivers to write beyond the output report allocation
during an event, causing a heap overflow:
[ 325.245240] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=046d, idProduct=c287
...
[ 414.518960] BUG kmalloc-4096 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
Additionally, while lg2 did correctly validate the report details, it was
cleaned up and shortened.
CVE-2013-2893
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[jmm: backported to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:30:49 +0000 (22:30 +0200)]
HID: pantherlord: validate output report details
commit
412f30105ec6735224535791eed5cdc02888ecb4 upstream
A HID device could send a malicious output report that would cause the
pantherlord HID driver to write beyond the output report allocation
during initialization, causing a heap overflow:
[ 310.939483] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0e8f, idProduct=0003
...
[ 315.980774] BUG kmalloc-192 (Tainted: G W ): Redzone overwritten
CVE-2013-2892
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 11 Sep 2013 19:56:51 +0000 (19:56 +0000)]
HID: zeroplus: validate output report details
commit
78214e81a1bf43740ce89bb5efda78eac2f8ef83 upstream
The zeroplus HID driver was not checking the size of allocated values
in fields it used. A HID device could send a malicious output report
that would cause the driver to write beyond the output report allocation
during initialization, causing a heap overflow:
[ 1442.728680] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0c12, idProduct=0005
...
[ 1466.243173] BUG kmalloc-192 (Tainted: G W ): Redzone overwritten
CVE-2013-2889
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[jmm: backport to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:29:55 +0000 (20:29 +0000)]
HID: validate HID report id size
commit
43622021d2e2b82ea03d883926605bdd0525e1d1 upstream
The "Report ID" field of a HID report is used to build indexes of
reports. The kernel's index of these is limited to 256 entries, so any
malicious device that sets a Report ID greater than 255 will trigger
memory corruption on the host:
[ 1347.156239] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffff88094958a878
[ 1347.156261] IP: [<
ffffffff813e4da0>] hid_register_report+0x2a/0x8b
CVE-2013-2888
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[jmm: backport to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Fri, 10 May 2013 21:48:21 +0000 (21:48 +0000)]
b43: stop format string leaking into error msgs
commit
e0e29b683d6784ef59bbc914eac85a04b650e63c upstream
The module parameter "fwpostfix" is userspace controllable, unfiltered,
and is used to define the firmware filename. b43_do_request_fw() populates
ctx->errors[] on error, containing the firmware filename. b43err()
parses its arguments as a format string. For systems with b43 hardware,
this could lead to a uid-0 to ring-0 escalation.
CVE-2013-2852
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kees Cook [Wed, 3 Jul 2013 22:01:14 +0000 (22:01 +0000)]
block: do not pass disk names as format strings
commit
ffc8b30866879ed9ba62bd0a86fecdbd51cd3d19 upstream
Disk names may contain arbitrary strings, so they must not be
interpreted as format strings. It seems that only md allows arbitrary
strings to be used for disk names, but this could allow for a local
memory corruption from uid 0 into ring 0.
CVE-2013-2851
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[jmm: Backport to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Nicolas Dichtel [Mon, 18 Feb 2013 15:24:20 +0000 (15:24 +0000)]
af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
commit
85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40 upstream
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Wed, 26 Jun 2013 21:52:30 +0000 (21:52 +0000)]
af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
commit
a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 upstream
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Wed, 26 Jun 2013 11:15:07 +0000 (11:15 +0000)]
ipv6: ip6_sk_dst_check() must not assume ipv6 dst
commit
a963a37d384d71ad43b3e9e79d68d42fbe0901f3 upstream
It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4
destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable,
not rt6_info.
ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else
various corruptions/crashes can happen.
Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with
trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect
With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Vlad Yasevich [Tue, 12 Mar 2013 15:53:23 +0000 (15:53 +0000)]
sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
commit
f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea upstream
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Max Matveev [Mon, 29 Aug 2011 21:02:24 +0000 (21:02 +0000)]
sctp: deal with multiple COOKIE_ECHO chunks
commit
d5ccd496601b8776a516d167a6485754575dc38f upstream
Attempt to reduce the number of IP packets emitted in response to single
SCTP packet (
2e3216cd) introduced a complication - if a packet contains
two COOKIE_ECHO chunks and nothing else then SCTP state machine corks the
socket while processing first COOKIE_ECHO and then loses the association
and forgets to uncork the socket. To deal with the issue add new SCTP
command which can be used to set association explictly. Use this new
command when processing second COOKIE_ECHO chunk to restore the context
for SCTP state machine.
Signed-off-by: Max Matveev <makc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jonathan Salwan [Wed, 3 Jul 2013 22:01:13 +0000 (22:01 +0000)]
drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c: use kzalloc() for failing hardware
commit
542db01579fbb7ea7d1f7bb9ddcef1559df660b2 upstream
In drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c mmc_ioctl_cdrom_read_data() allocates a memory
area with kmalloc in line 2885.
2885 cgc->buffer = kmalloc(blocksize, GFP_KERNEL);
2886 if (cgc->buffer == NULL)
2887 return -ENOMEM;
In line 2908 we can find the copy_to_user function:
2908 if (!ret && copy_to_user(arg, cgc->buffer, blocksize))
The cgc->buffer is never cleaned and initialized before this function.
If ret = 0 with the previous basic block, it's possible to display some
memory bytes in kernel space from userspace.
When we read a block from the disk it normally fills the ->buffer but if
the drive is malfunctioning there is a chance that it would only be
partially filled. The result is an leak information to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Dan Carpenter [Tue, 24 Sep 2013 22:27:44 +0000 (22:27 +0000)]
cpqarray: fix info leak in ida_locked_ioctl()
commit
627aad1c01da6f881e7f98d71fd928ca0c316b1a upstream
The pciinfo struct has a two byte hole after ->dev_fn so stack
information could be leaked to the user.
This was assigned CVE-2013-2147.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Miller <mike.miller@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Dan Carpenter [Tue, 24 Sep 2013 22:27:45 +0000 (22:27 +0000)]
cciss: fix info leak in cciss_ioctl32_passthru()
commit
58f09e00ae095e46ef9edfcf3a5fd9ccdfad065e upstream.
The arg64 struct has a hole after ->buf_size which isn't cleared. Or if
any of the calls to copy_from_user() fail then that would cause an
information leak as well.
This was assigned CVE-2013-2147.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Miller <mike.miller@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Tetsuo Handa [Mon, 30 Sep 2013 20:45:08 +0000 (13:45 -0700)]
kernel/kmod.c: check for NULL in call_usermodehelper_exec()
If /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains only "|", a NULL pointer
dereference happens upon core dump because argv_split("") returns
argv[0] == NULL.
This bug was once fixed by commit
264b83c07a84 ("usermodehelper: check
subprocess_info->path != NULL") but was by error reintroduced by commit
7f57cfa4e2aa ("usermodehelper: kill the sub_info->path[0] check").
This bug seems to exist since 2.6.19 (the version which core dump to
pipe was added). Depending on kernel version and config, some side
effect might happen immediately after this oops (e.g. kernel panic with
2.6.32-358.18.1.el6).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit
4c1c7be95c345cf2ad537a0c48e9aeadc7304527)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Ian Abbott [Thu, 10 Oct 2013 09:55:58 +0000 (10:55 +0100)]
staging: comedi: ni_65xx: (bug fix) confine insn_bits to one subdevice
Commit
677a31565692d596ef42ea589b53ba289abf4713 upstream.
The `insn_bits` handler `ni_65xx_dio_insn_bits()` has a `for` loop that
currently writes (optionally) and reads back up to 5 "ports" consisting
of 8 channels each. It reads up to 32 1-bit channels but can only read
and write a whole port at once - it needs to handle up to 5 ports as the
first channel it reads might not be aligned on a port boundary. It
breaks out of the loop early if the next port it handles is beyond the
final port on the card. It also breaks out early on the 5th port in the
loop if the first channel was aligned. Unfortunately, it doesn't check
that the current port it is dealing with belongs to the comedi subdevice
the `insn_bits` handler is acting on. That's a bug.
Redo the `for` loop to terminate after the final port belonging to the
subdevice, changing the loop variable in the process to simplify things
a bit. The `for` loop could now try and handle more than 5 ports if the
subdevice has more than 40 channels, but the test `if (bitshift >= 32)`
ensures it will break out early after 4 or 5 ports (depending on whether
the first channel is aligned on a port boundary). (`bitshift` will be
between -7 and 7 inclusive on the first iteration, increasing by 8 for
each subsequent operation.)
Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jitendra Bhivare [Fri, 6 Sep 2013 17:47:51 +0000 (23:17 +0530)]
intel-iommu: Flush unmaps at domain_exit
Backported Alex Williamson's commit to 2.6.32.y
http://git.kernel.org/linus/
7b668357810ecb5fdda4418689d50f5d95aea6a8
It resolves the following assert when module is immediately reloaded.
kernel BUG at drivers/pci/iova.c:155!
<snip>
Call Trace:
[<
ffffffff812645c5>] intel_alloc_iova+0xb5/0xe0
[<
ffffffff8126725e>] __intel_map_single+0xbe/0x210
[<
ffffffff812674ae>] intel_alloc_coherent+0xae/0x120
[<
ffffffffa035f909>] be_queue_alloc+0xb9/0x140 [be2net]
[<
ffffffffa035fa5a>] be_rx_qs_create+0xca/0x370 [be2net]
<snip>
The issue is reproducible in 2.6.32.60 and also gets resolved
by passing intel-iommu=strict to kernel.
Signed-off-by: Jitendra Bhivare <jitendra.bhivare@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Julian Anastasov [Sun, 17 Oct 2010 13:14:31 +0000 (16:14 +0300)]
ipvs: fix CHECKSUM_PARTIAL for TCP, UDP
Fix CHECKSUM_PARTIAL handling. Tested for IPv4 TCP,
UDP not tested because it needs network card with HW CSUM support.
May be fixes problem where IPVS can not be used in virtual boxes.
Problem appears with DNAT to local address when the local stack
sends reply in CHECKSUM_PARTIAL mode.
Fix tcp_dnat_handler and udp_dnat_handler to provide
vaddr and daddr in right order (old and new IP) when calling
tcp_partial_csum_update/udp_partial_csum_update (CHECKSUM_PARTIAL).
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
(cherry picked from commit
5bc9068e9d962ca6b8bec3f0eb6f60ab4dee1d04)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Willy Tarreau [Thu, 13 Jun 2013 17:36:35 +0000 (19:36 +0200)]
x86, ptrace: fix build breakage with gcc 4.7 (second try)
syscall_trace_enter() and syscall_trace_leave() are only called from
within asm code and do not need to be declared in the .c at all.
Removing their reference fixes the build issue that was happening
with gcc 4.7.
Both Sven-Haegar Koch and Christoph Biedl confirmed this patch
addresses their respective build issues.
Cc: Sven-Haegar Koch <haegar@sdinet.de>
Cc: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Willy Tarreau [Thu, 13 Jun 2013 14:40:05 +0000 (16:40 +0200)]
Revert "x86, ptrace: fix build breakage with gcc 4.7"
This reverts commit
4ed3bb08f1698c62685278051c19f474fbf961d2.
As reported by Sven-Haegar Koch, this patch breaks make headers_check :
CHECK include (0 files)
CHECK include/asm (54 files)
/home/haegar/src/2.6.32/linux/usr/include/asm/ptrace.h:5: included file 'linux/linkage.h' is not exported
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Ben Greear [Thu, 6 Jun 2013 21:29:49 +0000 (14:29 -0700)]
Fix lockup related to stop_machine being stuck in __do_softirq.
The stop machine logic can lock up if all but one of the migration
threads make it through the disable-irq step and the one remaining
thread gets stuck in __do_softirq. The reason __do_softirq can hang is
that it has a bail-out based on jiffies timeout, but in the lockup case,
jiffies itself is not incremented.
To work around this, re-add the max_restart counter in __do_irq and stop
processing irqs after 10 restarts.
Thanks to Tejun Heo and Rusty Russell and others for helping me track
this down.
This was introduced in 3.9 by commit
c10d73671ad3 ("softirq: reduce
latencies").
It may be worth looking into ath9k to see if it has issues with its irq
handler at a later date.
The hang stack traces look something like this:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at kernel/watchdog.c:245 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7()
Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 2
Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc]
Pid: 23, comm: migration/2 Tainted: G C 3.9.4+ #11
Call Trace:
<NMI> warn_slowpath_common+0x85/0x9f
warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48
watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7
__perf_event_overflow+0x137/0x1cb
perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x16
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x2dc/0x359
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x19/0x1b
nmi_handle+0x7f/0xc2
do_nmi+0xbc/0x304
end_repeat_nmi+0x1e/0x2e
<<EOE>>
cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162
smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260
kthread+0xc7/0xcf
ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
---[ end trace
4947dfa9b0a4cec3 ]---
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [migration/1:17]
Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc]
irq event stamp:
835637905
hardirqs last enabled at (
835637904): __do_softirq+0x9f/0x257
hardirqs last disabled at (
835637905): apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80
softirqs last enabled at (
5654720): __do_softirq+0x1ff/0x257
softirqs last disabled at (
5654725): irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb
CPU 1
Pid: 17, comm: migration/1 Tainted: G WC 3.9.4+ #11 To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M.
RIP: tasklet_hi_action+0xf0/0xf0
Process migration/1
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__do_softirq+0x117/0x257
irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0x98
apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x80
<EOI>
printk+0x4d/0x4f
stop_machine_cpu_stop+0x22c/0x274
cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162
smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260
kthread+0xc7/0xcf
ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@iki.fi>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit
34376a50fb1fa095b9d0636fa41ed2e73125f214)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Thomas Bork [Sun, 16 Jun 2013 17:47:23 +0000 (19:47 +0200)]
scsi: fix missing include linux/types.h in scsi_netlink.h
Thomas Bork reported that commit
c6203cd ("scsi: use __uX
types for headers exported to user space") caused a regression
as now he's getting this warning :
> /usr/src/linux-2.6.32-eisfair-1/usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:108:
> found __[us]{8,16,32,64} type without #include <linux/types.h>
This issue was addressed later by commit
10db4e1 ("headers:
include linux/types.h where appropriate"), so let's just pick the
relevant part from it.
Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Willy Tarreau [Mon, 10 Jun 2013 09:42:10 +0000 (11:42 +0200)]
Linux 2.6.32.61
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Willy Tarreau [Fri, 7 Jun 2013 05:11:37 +0000 (07:11 +0200)]
x86, ptrace: fix build breakage with gcc 4.7
Christoph Biedl reported that 2.6.32 does not build with gcc 4.7 on
i386 :
CC arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1472:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_enter'
In file included from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0,
from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10,
from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22,
from include/linux/thread_info.h:56,
from include/linux/preempt.h:9,
from include/linux/spinlock.h:50,
from include/linux/seqlock.h:29,
from include/linux/time.h:8,
from include/linux/timex.h:56,
from include/linux/sched.h:56,
from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11:
/«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:145:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_enter' was here
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1517:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_leave'
In file included from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0,
from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10,
from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22,
from include/linux/thread_info.h:56,
from include/linux/preempt.h:9,
from include/linux/spinlock.h:50,
from include/linux/seqlock.h:29,
from include/linux/time.h:8,
from include/linux/timex.h:56,
from include/linux/sched.h:56,
from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11:
/«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:146:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_leave' was here
make[4]: *** [arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o] Error 1
make[3]: *** [arch/x86/kernel] Error 2
make[3]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
He also found that this issue did not appear in more recent kernels since
this asmregparm disappeared in 3.0-rc1 with commit
1b4ac2a935 that was
applied after some UM changes that we don't necessarily want in 2.6.32.
Thus, the cleanest fix for older kernels is to make the declaration in
ptrace.h match the one in ptrace.c by specifying asmregparm on these
functions. They're only called from asm which explains why it used to
work despite the inconsistency in the declaration.
Reported-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Tested-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Kashyap, Desai [Mon, 5 Apr 2010 08:49:21 +0000 (14:19 +0530)]
mpt2sas: Send default descriptor for RAID pass through in mpt2ctl
commit
ebda4d38df542e1ff4747c4daadfc7da250b4fa6 upstream.
RAID_SCSI_IO_PASSTHROUGH: Driver needs to be sending the default
descriptor for RAID Passthru, currently its sending SCSI_IO descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:52:00 +0000 (01:52 +0000)]
tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
commit
60085c3d009b0df252547adb336d1ccca5ce52ec upstream.
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:53 +0000 (01:51 +0000)]
irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
commit
5ae94c0d2f0bed41d6718be743985d61b7f5c47d upstream.
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf: adjusted to apply to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:59 +0000 (01:51 +0000)]
rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit
4a184233f21645cf0b719366210ed445d1024d72 ]
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Weiping Pan [Mon, 23 Jul 2012 02:37:48 +0000 (10:37 +0800)]
rds: set correct msg_namelen
commit
06b6a1cf6e776426766298d055bb3991957d90a7 upstream
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-
1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf: Adjusted to apply to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:56 +0000 (01:51 +0000)]
llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit
c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181 ]
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Wed, 15 Aug 2012 11:31:53 +0000 (11:31 +0000)]
llc: fix info leak via getsockname()
[ Upstream commit
3592aaeb80290bda0f2cf0b5456c97bfc638b192 ]
The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.
Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:54 +0000 (01:51 +0000)]
iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit
a5598bd9c087dc0efc250a5221e5d0e6f584ee88 ]
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Wu Fengguang [Thu, 2 Aug 2012 23:10:01 +0000 (23:10 +0000)]
isdnloop: fix and simplify isdnloop_init()
[ Upstream commit
77f00f6324cb97cf1df6f9c4aaeea6ada23abdb2 ]
Fix a buffer overflow bug by removing the revision and printk.
[ 22.016214] isdnloop-ISDN-driver Rev 1.11.6.7
[ 22.097508] isdnloop: (loop0) virtual card added
[ 22.174400] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in:
ffffffff83244972
[ 22.174400]
[ 22.436157] Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted
3.5.0-bisect-00018-gfa8bbb1-dirty #129
[ 22.624071] Call Trace:
[ 22.720558] [<
ffffffff832448c3>] ? CallcNew+0x56/0x56
[ 22.815248] [<
ffffffff8222b623>] panic+0x110/0x329
[ 22.914330] [<
ffffffff83244972>] ? isdnloop_init+0xaf/0xb1
[ 23.014800] [<
ffffffff832448c3>] ? CallcNew+0x56/0x56
[ 23.090763] [<
ffffffff8108e24b>] __stack_chk_fail+0x2b/0x30
[ 23.185748] [<
ffffffff83244972>] isdnloop_init+0xaf/0xb1
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:48 +0000 (01:51 +0000)]
ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit
ef3313e84acbf349caecae942ab3ab731471f1a1 ]
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Wed, 15 Aug 2012 11:31:44 +0000 (11:31 +0000)]
atm: fix info leak in getsockopt(SO_ATMPVC)
commit
e862f1a9b7df4e8196ebec45ac62295138aa3fc2 upstream.
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Wed, 15 Aug 2012 11:31:45 +0000 (11:31 +0000)]
atm: fix info leak via getsockname()
commit
3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a upstream.
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sun, 7 Apr 2013 01:51:47 +0000 (01:51 +0000)]
atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit
9b3e617f3df53822345a8573b6d358f6b9e5ed87 ]
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Wed, 15 Aug 2012 11:31:56 +0000 (11:31 +0000)]
ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
commit
2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680 upstream.
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jesper Dangaard Brouer [Tue, 28 Aug 2012 20:05:51 +0000 (22:05 +0200)]
ipvs: IPv6 MTU checking cleanup and bugfix
Cleaning up the IPv6 MTU checking in the IPVS xmit code, by using
a common helper function __mtu_check_toobig_v6().
The MTU check for tunnel mode can also use this helper as
ntohs(old_iph->payload_len) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) is qual to
skb->len. And the 'mtu' variable have been adjusted before
calling helper.
Notice, this also fixes a bug, as the the MTU check in ip_vs_dr_xmit_v6()
were missing a check for skb_is_gso().
This bug e.g. caused issues for KVM IPVS setups, where different
Segmentation Offloading techniques are utilized, between guests,
via the virtio driver. This resulted in very bad performance,
due to the ICMPv6 "too big" messages didn't affect the sender.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
(cherry picked from commit
590e3f79a21edd2e9857ac3ced25ba6b2a491ef8)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Simon Horman [Tue, 9 Nov 2010 01:08:49 +0000 (10:08 +0900)]
ipvs: allow transmit of GRO aggregated skbs
Attempt at allowing LVS to transmit skbs of greater than MTU length that
have been aggregated by GRO and can thus be deaggregated by GSO.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
(cherry picked from commit
8f1b03a4c18e8f3f0801447b62330faa8ed3bb37)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jozsef Kadlecsik [Tue, 3 Apr 2012 20:02:01 +0000 (22:02 +0200)]
netfilter: nf_ct_ipv4: packets with wrong ihl are invalid
commit
07153c6ec074257ade76a461429b567cff2b3a1e upstream.
It was reported that the Linux kernel sometimes logs:
klogd: [
2629147.402413] kernel BUG at net / netfilter /
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 447!
klogd: [
1072212.887368] kernel BUG at net / netfilter /
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 392
ipv4_get_l4proto() in nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c and tcp_error() in
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c should catch malformed packets, so the errors
at the indicated lines - TCP options parsing - should not happen.
However, tcp_error() relies on the "dataoff" offset to the TCP header,
calculated by ipv4_get_l4proto(). But ipv4_get_l4proto() does not check
bogus ihl values in IPv4 packets, which then can slip through tcp_error()
and get caught at the TCP options parsing routines.
The patch fixes ipv4_get_l4proto() by invalidating packets with bogus
ihl value.
The patch closes netfilter bugzilla id 771.
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Tue, 9 Aug 2011 06:44:00 +0000 (23:44 -0700)]
ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
[ Backport of upstream commit
87c48fa3b4630905f98268dde838ee43626a060c ]
Fernando Gont reported current IPv6 fragment identification generation
was not secure, because using a very predictable system-wide generator,
allowing various attacks.
IPv4 uses inetpeer cache to address this problem and to get good
performance. We'll use this mechanism when IPv6 inetpeer is stable
enough in linux-3.1
For the time being, we use jhash on destination address to provide less
predictable identifications. Also remove a spinlock and use cmpxchg() to
get better SMP performance.
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[bwh: Backport further to 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Nicolas Dichtel [Fri, 3 Sep 2010 05:13:05 +0000 (05:13 +0000)]
ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
commit
70789d7052239992824628db8133de08dc78e593 upstream
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Daniel Borkmann [Thu, 7 Feb 2013 00:55:37 +0000 (00:55 +0000)]
net: sctp: sctp_auth_key_put: use kzfree instead of kfree
[ Upstream commit
586c31f3bf04c290dc0a0de7fc91d20aa9a5ee53 ]
For sensitive data like keying material, it is common practice to zero
out keys before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use
kzfree instead of kfree.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Daniel Borkmann [Fri, 8 Feb 2013 03:04:35 +0000 (03:04 +0000)]
net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data
[ Upstream commit
b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]
On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Daniel Borkmann [Fri, 8 Feb 2013 03:04:34 +0000 (03:04 +0000)]
net: sctp: sctp_setsockopt_auth_key: use kzfree instead of kfree
[ Upstream commit
6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 ]
In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user
passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after
internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we
should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the
allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in
sctp_auth_key_put().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Tommi Rantala [Tue, 27 Nov 2012 04:01:46 +0000 (04:01 +0000)]
sctp: fix memory leak in sctp_datamsg_from_user() when copy from user space fails
[ Upstream commit
be364c8c0f17a3dd42707b5a090b318028538eb9 ]
Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP,
reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid
user space pointer in the second argument:
#include <string.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main(void)
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_in sa;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
if (fd < 0)
return 1;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
sa.sin_port = htons(11111);
sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
return 0;
}
As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003.
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Sat, 9 Mar 2013 05:52:21 +0000 (05:52 +0000)]
dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
commit
29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0 upstream.
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: no support for IEEE or CEE commands, so only
deal with perm_addr]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Paul Moore [Mon, 25 Mar 2013 03:18:33 +0000 (03:18 +0000)]
unix: fix a race condition in unix_release()
[ Upstream commit
ded34e0fe8fe8c2d595bfa30626654e4b87621e0 ]
As reported by Jan, and others over the past few years, there is a
race condition caused by unix_release setting the sock->sk pointer
to NULL before properly marking the socket as dead/orphaned. This
can cause a problem with the LSM hook security_unix_may_send() if
there is another socket attempting to write to this partially
released socket in between when sock->sk is set to NULL and it is
marked as dead/orphaned. This patch fixes this by only setting
sock->sk to NULL after the socket has been marked as dead; I also
take the opportunity to make unix_release_sock() a void function
as it only ever returned 0/success.
Dave, I think this one should go on the -stable pile.
Special thanks to Jan for coming up with a reproducer for this
problem.
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jan.stancek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Thu, 21 Mar 2013 17:36:09 +0000 (17:36 +0000)]
tcp: preserve ACK clocking in TSO
[ Upstream commit
f4541d60a449afd40448b06496dcd510f505928e ]
A long standing problem with TSO is the fact that tcp_tso_should_defer()
rearms the deferred timer, while it should not.
Current code leads to following bad bursty behavior :
20:11:24.484333 IP A > B: . 297161:316921(19760) ack 1 win 119
20:11:24.484337 IP B > A: . ack 263721 win 1117
20:11:24.485086 IP B > A: . ack 265241 win 1117
20:11:24.485925 IP B > A: . ack 266761 win 1117
20:11:24.486759 IP B > A: . ack 268281 win 1117
20:11:24.487594 IP B > A: . ack 269801 win 1117
20:11:24.488430 IP B > A: . ack 271321 win 1117
20:11:24.489267 IP B > A: . ack 272841 win 1117
20:11:24.490104 IP B > A: . ack 274361 win 1117
20:11:24.490939 IP B > A: . ack 275881 win 1117
20:11:24.491775 IP B > A: . ack 277401 win 1117
20:11:24.491784 IP A > B: . 316921:332881(15960) ack 1 win 119
20:11:24.492620 IP B > A: . ack 278921 win 1117
20:11:24.493448 IP B > A: . ack 280441 win 1117
20:11:24.494286 IP B > A: . ack 281961 win 1117
20:11:24.495122 IP B > A: . ack 283481 win 1117
20:11:24.495958 IP B > A: . ack 285001 win 1117
20:11:24.496791 IP B > A: . ack 286521 win 1117
20:11:24.497628 IP B > A: . ack 288041 win 1117
20:11:24.498459 IP B > A: . ack 289561 win 1117
20:11:24.499296 IP B > A: . ack 291081 win 1117
20:11:24.500133 IP B > A: . ack 292601 win 1117
20:11:24.500970 IP B > A: . ack 294121 win 1117
20:11:24.501388 IP B > A: . ack 295641 win 1117
20:11:24.501398 IP A > B: . 332881:351881(19000) ack 1 win 119
While the expected behavior is more like :
20:19:49.259620 IP A > B: . 197601:202161(4560) ack 1 win 119
20:19:49.260446 IP B > A: . ack 154281 win 1212
20:19:49.261282 IP B > A: . ack 155801 win 1212
20:19:49.262125 IP B > A: . ack 157321 win 1212
20:19:49.262136 IP A > B: . 202161:206721(4560) ack 1 win 119
20:19:49.262958 IP B > A: . ack 158841 win 1212
20:19:49.263795 IP B > A: . ack 160361 win 1212
20:19:49.264628 IP B > A: . ack 161881 win 1212
20:19:49.264637 IP A > B: . 206721:211281(4560) ack 1 win 119
20:19:49.265465 IP B > A: . ack 163401 win 1212
20:19:49.265886 IP B > A: . ack 164921 win 1212
20:19:49.266722 IP B > A: . ack 166441 win 1212
20:19:49.266732 IP A > B: . 211281:215841(4560) ack 1 win 119
20:19:49.267559 IP B > A: . ack 167961 win 1212
20:19:49.268394 IP B > A: . ack 169481 win 1212
20:19:49.269232 IP B > A: . ack 171001 win 1212
20:19:49.269241 IP A > B: . 215841:221161(5320) ack 1 win 119
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Sun, 6 Jan 2013 18:21:49 +0000 (18:21 +0000)]
tcp: fix MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST logic
[ Upstream commit
ae62ca7b03217be5e74759dc6d7698c95df498b3 ]
commit
35f9c09fe9c72e (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag : MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST meant to be set on all
frags but the last one for a splice() call.
The condition used to set the flag in pipe_to_sendpage() relied on
splice() user passing the exact number of bytes present in the pipe,
or a smaller one.
But some programs pass an arbitrary high value, and the test fails.
The effect of this bug is a lack of tcp_push() at the end of a
splice(pipe -> socket) call, and possibly very slow or erratic TCP
sessions.
We should both test sd->total_len and fact that another fragment
is in the pipe (pipe->nrbufs > 1)
Many thanks to Willy for providing very clear bug report, bisection
and test programs.
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Bisected-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Wed, 25 Apr 2012 02:12:06 +0000 (22:12 -0400)]
tcp: allow splice() to build full TSO packets
[ This combines upstream commit
2f53384424251c06038ae612e56231b96ab610ee and the follow-on bug fix
commit
35f9c09fe9c72eb8ca2b8e89a593e1c151f28fc2 ]
vmsplice()/splice(pipe, socket) call do_tcp_sendpages() one page at a
time, adding at most 4096 bytes to an skb. (assuming PAGE_SIZE=4096)
The call to tcp_push() at the end of do_tcp_sendpages() forces an
immediate xmit when pipe is not already filled, and tso_fragment() try
to split these skb to MSS multiples.
4096 bytes are usually split in a skb with 2 MSS, and a remaining
sub-mss skb (assuming MTU=1500)
This makes slow start suboptimal because many small frames are sent to
qdisc/driver layers instead of big ones (constrained by cwnd and packets
in flight of course)
In fact, applications using sendmsg() (adding an additional memory copy)
instead of vmsplice()/splice()/sendfile() are a bit faster because of
this anomaly, especially if serving small files in environments with
large initial [c]wnd.
Call tcp_push() only if MSG_MORE is not set in the flags parameter.
This bit is automatically provided by splice() internals but for the
last page, or on all pages if user specified SPLICE_F_MORE splice()
flag.
In some workloads, this can reduce number of sent logical packets by an
order of magnitude, making zero-copy TCP actually faster than
one-copy :)
Reported-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Thu, 21 Apr 2011 09:45:37 +0000 (09:45 +0000)]
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
commit
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 upstream.
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[dannf/bwh: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Mathias Krause [Wed, 15 Aug 2012 11:31:57 +0000 (11:31 +0000)]
net: fix info leak in compat dev_ifconf()
commit
43da5f2e0d0c69ded3d51907d9552310a6b545e8 upstream.
The implementation of dev_ifconf() for the compat ioctl interface uses
an intermediate ifc structure allocated in userland for the duration of
the syscall. Though, it fails to initialize the padding bytes inserted
for alignment and that for leaks four bytes of kernel stack. Add an
explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Eric Dumazet [Mon, 24 Sep 2012 07:00:11 +0000 (07:00 +0000)]
net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
[ Upstream commit
3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582 ]
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Jesper Dangaard Brouer [Wed, 31 Oct 2012 02:45:32 +0000 (02:45 +0000)]
net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
commit
8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664 upstream
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cong Wang [Mon, 7 Jan 2013 21:17:00 +0000 (21:17 +0000)]
net: prevent setting ttl=0 via IP_TTL
[ Upstream commit
c9be4a5c49cf51cc70a993f004c5bb30067a65ce ]
A regression is introduced by the following commit:
commit
4d52cfbef6266092d535237ba5a4b981458ab171
Author: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 2 00:42:16 2009 -0700
net: ipv4/ip_sockglue.c cleanups
Pure cleanups
but it is not a pure cleanup...
- if (val != -1 && (val < 1 || val>255))
+ if (val != -1 && (val < 0 || val > 255))
Since there is no reason provided to allow ttl=0, change it back.
Reported-by: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com>
Cc: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Stefan Hasko [Fri, 21 Dec 2012 15:04:59 +0000 (15:04 +0000)]
net: sched: integer overflow fix
[ Upstream commit
d2fe85da52e89b8012ffad010ef352a964725d5f ]
Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Hiroaki SHIMODA [Fri, 3 Aug 2012 10:57:52 +0000 (19:57 +0900)]
net_sched: gact: Fix potential panic in tcf_gact().
[ Upstream commit
696ecdc10622d86541f2e35cc16e15b6b3b1b67e ]
gact_rand array is accessed by gact->tcfg_ptype whose value
is assumed to less than MAX_RAND, but any range checks are
not performed.
So add a check in tcf_gact_init(). And in tcf_gact(), we can
reduce a branch.
Signed-off-by: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Benjamin LaHaise [Fri, 19 Oct 2012 19:21:01 +0000 (15:21 -0400)]
ipv4: check rt_genid in dst_check
commit
d11a4dc18bf41719c9f0d7ed494d295dd2973b92
Author: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Date: Thu Mar 18 23:20:20 2010 +0000
ipv4: check rt_genid in dst_check
Xfrm_dst keeps a reference to ipv4 rtable entries on each
cached bundle. The only way to renew xfrm_dst when the underlying
route has changed, is to implement dst_check for this. This is
what ipv6 side does too.
The problems started after
87c1e12b5eeb7b30b4b41291bef8e0b41fc3dde9
("ipsec: Fix bogus bundle flowi") which fixed a bug causing xfrm_dst
to not get reused, until that all lookups always generated new
xfrm_dst with new route reference and path mtu worked. But after the
fix, the old routes started to get reused even after they were expired
causing pmtu to break (well it would occationally work if the rtable
gc had run recently and marked the route obsolete causing dst_check to
get called).
Signed-off-by: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is based on the above, with the addition of verifying blackhole
routes in the same manner.
Fixing the issue with blackhole routes as it was accomplished in mainline
would require pulling in a lot more code, and people were not interested
in pulling in all of the dependencies given the much higher risk of trying
to select the right subset of changes to include. The addition of the
single line of "dst->obsolete = -1;" in ipv4_dst_blackhole() was much
easier to verify, and is in the spirit of the patch in question.
This is the minimal set of changes to fix the bug in question.
A test case is available here :
http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=
135015076708950&w=2
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Hillf Danton [Fri, 10 Dec 2010 18:54:11 +0000 (18:54 +0000)]
bonding: Fix slave selection bug.
The returned slave is incorrect, if the net device under check is not
charged yet by the master.
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit
af3e5bd5f650163c2e12297f572910a1af1b8236)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>